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Bridging the Gap
A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler
Verena Gottschling
In my commentary on this rich paper, I will focus on the methodological approach
proposed by Schooler. The main goal of this commentary is to introduce an im-
proved and more detailed interpretation of Schooler’s distinction between experi-
ential consciousness and meta-awareness. I will address four issues. After sum-
marizing Schooler’s main ideas, I will discuss some general problems regarding
the proposed distinction between experiential consciousness and meta-awareness.
I will relate the distinction to the more general debate. I then discuss some con-
ceptual claims to which Schooler seems to be committed to making, and show how
they relate to one another. I point to some tension between them. As I will argue,
the central issue has to do with the underspecified notion of “reflection”. Different
kinds of reflection are required for Schooler’s “pure experience” and for meta-
awareness. I will try to get a better grasp on the author’s underlying position by
discussing the main empirical evidence motivating the account, namely mind-wan-
dering, in section two. I argue that the evidence does not support the distinction
as introduced, but does give us some insight into the complexity of the required
meta-cognitive processes. I will suggest some conceptual changes in the underly-
ing framework, which I believe make the main project stronger and help to avoid
some of the problems we have encountered. Specifically, I want to introduce a
taxonomy of different kinds of reflection and show which kinds of reflections might
required both for Schooler’s “pure experience” and for his meta-awareness. In the
third section, I turn to the author’s main claim, which is the existence of a new
meta-perspective. According to Schooler, this is the central proposal of his paper,
and it follows from his initial perceptual-perspective-shifting analogy and the dis-
tinction he proposes. Schooler claims that the meta-perspective helps us to over-
come the limitations of both perspectives: the first person perspective and the
third person perspective. In effect,  by introducing the meta-perspective we can
bridge the gap between self-reported experiences and observable behavior, and
get a completely new perspective on the mind–body problem. As I will argue, this
ontological element is relatively independent of the rest of his methodological
project. Moreover, it is an unnecessary strategic move. 
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1 Introduction
Starting  from  perceptual  perspective  shifting,
Schooler focuses on the gap between self-repor-
ted  experiences  (the  first-person  perspective)
and observable behavior (the third-person per-
spective). So consciousness versus self-awareness
of being in a certain state, and the relationship
of both of these to observable behavior is at the
heart of the project. The main goal of the tar-
get paper is to introduce a new methodology for
studying  conscious  versus  unconscious  states
and processes. Although this is a very rich pa-
per,  we  are  not  given  too  much  information
about the conceptual framework and the way in
which Schooler’s proposal relates to the contem-
porary  philosophical  debate  about  conscious-
ness, reportability, and accessibility. This aspect
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will  be  my  focus:  the  relationship  between
philosophical  theories  of  consciousness  and
Schooler’s account. 
Schooler’s (this collection) project uses the
combined strategy of self-reports, observable be-
havior,  and physiological measurements of  the
body: a “trust but verify” (p. 8) approach to re-
ports of subjects’ experience. He is interested in:
the  relationship  between  people’s  belief
about  their  experience  and  empirical  in-
dices of their underlying mental states. [..]
Moreover,  the theory of  the  intermittent
and  imperfect  nature  of  meta-awareness
as  a  re-representation  of  experience […]
provides a scaffold for conceptualizing the
situations in which  beliefs and underlying
experience  converge  and  diverge.  (p.  19,
emphasis added)
Though  it  sounds  at  the  beginning  as  if
Schooler is making a claim about internal states
in general in general, it quickly becomes clear
that he indeed makes a claim about the per-
sonal-level,  or  conscious  internal  states.  In  so
doing, he transitions from internal states to a
certain kind of internal state—a conscious one.
Later in the paper we find similar transitions:
first we find a statement that can be interpreted
as talking about all internal states, or verbally
reportable knowledge of one’s states, but then
he immediately  makes  a  statement  about  the
underlying experience. For example, he informs
us  that  in  mind-wandering  we  can  “identify
situations in which all evidence suggests people
are routinely lacking in their current knowledge
of their on-going mental states” (Schooler this
collection, p. 19, emphasis added). A little later
we  find  a  statement  about  experience,  thus
knowledge or beliefs about conscious states:
In short, a strong case can be made for the
value of using 3rd person science to inform
not only our understanding of people’s be-
liefs  about  their  experience,  but  also  to
discern when those beliefs are likely to be
accurate and when they may be inaccurate
or incomplete. (Schooler this collection, p.
20, emphasis added)
A similar transition from a statement about in-
ternal states to a statement about conscious in-
ternal states, which as a result can be reported,
can also found slightly earlier: 
by  using  various  reasonable  markers  of
people’s internal states we have been able
to  examine  the  conditions  under  which
people’s reports are more or less likely to
be aligned with their experience. (Schooler
this collection, p. 19, emphasis added)
To summarize, it seems that “what is going on
in someone’s mind”, in Schooler’s terminology,
refers to the conscious mind. His approach loc-
ates him in a group of thinkers1 who challenge
the  notion  of  accurate  reportability,  or  who
challenge access as the main criterion for con-
scious experience.  There is  a  very active con-
temporary dispute  between defenders  of  what
have  been  dubbed  cognitive  accounts  of  con-
sciousness and proponents of non-cognitive ac-
counts (Overgaard & Grünbaum 2011). Oppon-
ents of cognitive approaches associate conscious-
ness with cognitive functions like controlled pro-
cessing, working memory, selective attention, or
some network of  different cognitive processes.2
Because of this association, these functions can
be used  to  study  consciousness  from a  third-
person  perspective.  In  contrast,  non-cognitive
approaches assume that consciousness cannot be
operationalized in terms of  cognitive function.
Consequently,  these  accounts  dissociate  con-
sciousness  from  cognitive  capacities.  Which
leaves us (typically) with just subjective criteria
as acceptable for studying consciousness. Obvi-
ously Schooler’s account is an example of a cog-
nitive approach. In my opinion, this general dis-
pute cannot be resolved by empirical evidence
because neither of these approaches can be em-
pirically falsified, or at least the empirical evid-
ence can in principle be explained both ways—
in essence we have a clash of intuitions, and the
evidence can be interpreted as supporting op-
posing views.3 However, the approach one favors
1 See for example Seth et al. (2005), who presented a proposal close in spirit.
2 See Overgaard & Grünbaum (2011); Block (2011); Cohen & Dennett
(2011); Kouider et al. (2010).
3 See the debate about alternative explanations of the findings of atypical percep-
tual conditions (for example of the Sperling paradigm) in the references above.
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will  obviously determine one’s  criteria  of  con-
sciousness, the experimental methodology used,
and, consequently, one’s findings. Nonetheless, I
do not want to go too much into this very wide
dispute,  partly  because  I  think  it  would  be
rather  fruitless.4 So  for  the  purposes  of  this
commentary, I will focus on issues within cognit-
ive approaches alongside Schooler’s cognitive ac-
count. But the objections against cognitive ac-
counts  of  consciousness  in  general  are  issues
that Schooler, given his introduction of a cog-
nitive  methodological  approach  for  studying
consciousness, potentially needs to address. 
By using mind-wandering as his main ex-
ample, Schooler then proposes a list of criteria
that—so the idea goes—might help us to get a
better grasp on the conscious experience, and
not just conscious states to which we attend or
states of which we are meta-aware. This under-
lying conceptual distinction turns out to be es-
sential for Schooler’s overall project.
One way of interpreting Schooler’s account
is  to see it  as  a combination of  a number of
claims, which is evident in the quote above. He
himself, right after introducing the distinction,
argues  that  the  two  cases  come  apart  in
mindreading,  and  the  fact  that  “people
routinely shift perspective (from simply experi-
encing to attempting to re-represent  their  ex-
perience to themselves) provides the foundation
for  a  framework  of  scientifically  investigating
first  person  perspective”  (Schooler this collec-
tion, p. 9). The implicit  main argument of the
paper can be reconstructed in the following way:
(1) Schooler introduces a conceptual dis-
tinction between experience and meta-qwareness
as a re-representation of experience.
(2)  He  then  presents  empirical  evidence
that this conceptual distinction corresponds to
reality, in mind-wandering and other cases. 
(3) He then uses this evidence to suggest a
general list of testable features for those inter-
ested in the empirical investigation of conscious-
4 By this I mean that the evidence does not allow us to rule out
the  whole  class  of  cognitive  versus  non-cognitive  accounts.  I
think however,  that certain  accounts  within theses classes  are
vulnerable  to  evidence;  for  example,  explicit  accessibility  ac-
counts (Prinz 2012) seem to have a lot less room to maneuver.
But  as  a  debate  between  cognitive  versus  non-cognitive  ac-
counts, the possibilities for interesting general insights seem lim-
ited.
ness. The last issue is particularly important: in
effect, Schooler suggests replacing the classical
testable  criterion  for  consciousness,  (oral)  re-
portability, or accessibility to introspection, by
several criteria, which are testable and available
from the third-person perspective. 
(4)  He claims that  this  gives  us a prin-
cipled  new  way  of  reconciling  the  tension
between the first- and third-person perspective
by  introducing  a  higher  meta-perspective,  an
ontological  claim;  in  essence,  this  meta-per-
spective allows for a new strategy to solve the
mind-body  problem.  We  are  promised  the
above-mentioned new “framework for scientific-
ally  investigating  first-person  experience”
(Schooler (this collection, p. 9) resulting from
the analogy of perspective shifting.
2 The revised view
There is much more in the target paper than I
have mentioned here. For the purposes of this
commentary, I will focus on four issues related
to the general issue of consciousness, which then
result in the presentation of a revised version of
the author’s account. Now that I have summar-
ized what I take to be the author’s most im-
portant ideas, I will discuss some general prob-
lems the underlying distinction seems to bring
with it.  This  section  receives  my main atten-
tion. I will try to localize the distinction within
theories  of  consciousness.  I  then discuss  some
underlying conceptual claims to which Schooler
is committed to making, and show how they re-
late to one another. I will point out that there
is serious tension between them. In the second
section, I will discuss in more detail the main
empirical evidence that motivates the account—
mind-wandering—, and introduce the proposed
criteria. My epistemic goals in the commentary
are,  first,  to  determine  the  exact  relationship
between  the  initial  distinction,  the  evidence
presented,  and  the  proposed  list  of  criteria.
Second, to discuss  of  how we should evaluate
certain criteria, and what they tell us about un-
derlying  concepts  of  meta-awareness,  access,
and reflection. Third, to gain some insight into
the relationship between one’s position regard-
ing the mind–body problem and the suggestion
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the author draws from his perceptual perspect-
ive shifting analogy. According to Schooler, this
is the central proposal of his paper; he claims
the existence of a new-meta-perspective, which
helps to overcome the limitations of both per-
spectives  and  thereby  solves  the  mind–body
problem. As I shall argue, this element is relat-
ively independent from the rest of the project.
Moreover, I think it weakens the main project. 
As a positive contribution, I will suggest
some  conceptual  changes  of  the  underlying
framework. The changes I will suggest include
giving  up  some  claims  and  revising  others.  I
think  these  changes  make  the  main  project,
which I take to be a methodological strategy for
studying consciousness, stronger. They also help
to avoid some problems we encountered in the
discussion of the main argument. I also suggest
a finer-grained specification of different kinds of
reflection  and taking  stock.  This  will  help  to
give us a better understanding of  meta-cogni-
tion in general as well as of consciousness and
awareness of being in a certain state as distinct
phenomena. I take this to be a driving idea in
Schooler’s initial distinction.
3 The category of “conscious but un-
accessed” states
Traditionally, we find a distinction in the literat-
ure between two categories: on the one hand con-
scious experiences, states, and processes to which
subjects have access, and on the other hand un-
conscious processes to which they do not have ac-
cess (Cohen & Dennett 2011). According to this
general picture, access to these states and pro-
cesses then includes in many cases accurate re-
portability, which is the reason why reportability,
or accessibility to introspection, is central to any
judgment about conscious states. But access can
also be understood more broadly: not all access is
conscious itself, and not all access results in beha-
vioral or verbal reportability.
In  general,  if  we  have  a  conscious  state
and  a  corresponding  unconscious  state,  there
are two possibilities for how the two can differ.5
5 Of course hybrids are possible, so we might have combinations of
functional differences and differences in content. I take Tye (1995) to
defend such an account.
The  first  option  is  that  the  representational
content of a state determines the experience, at
least in part, so that both states differ in con-
tent.  My  conscious  belief  that  my  partner  is
cheating on me has a different representational
content than the corresponding unconscious be-
lief.  These  accounts  are  first-order  accounts.
The  second  option  is  that  the  states  have
identical representational content, but there is a
difference in kind in the way in which they are
embedded in the system—in philosophical jar-
gon,  the  functional  role  that  each state  plays
differs. According to this position, my conscious
and unconscious suspicious beliefs that my part-
ner is cheating on me are two states with the
same  content—expressed  in  the  that-clause—
but the conscious belief causes different internal
states and different behavior to my unconscious
belief. For example, in the conscious case, I will
have the conscious thought that he is not treat-
ing me respectfully, and I might verbally con-
front him right away; in the second, unconscious
case, neither of these activities will happen. 
The  first  option  is  consistent  with  the
standard view of what determines a difference
in experience. However, it has a disadvantage:
we cannot explain why the two states “corres-
pond” unless there is some significant semantic
overlap between them. The functional role view
has the advantage that it can explain the simil-
arity between the two states, but the disadvant-
age that we need an explanation of  what ex-
actly it is that makes a state conscious, and we
have to show why this difference results in a dif-
ference in experience.
Schooler seems to opt for the content or rep-
resentational  view.  Picking  up  Dennett’s  idea6
that people can be inaccurate about their  own
mental  going-ons  and  internal  states,  Schooler
concludes that,  at least in some situations, ex-
ternal  observers  can have  better  insight  into a
subject’s experience than the subject themselves
(p. 8). However, as we saw in the quotes above,
Schooler seems to interpret the internal states in
question as conscious internal states. 
This is consistent with the idea that the
access to internal states changes the content of
6 See Schooler (this collection), p. 8.
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the  state,  i.e.,  the  content  view:  accessing  a
state changes the content of the state. Since the
content determines the experience, the experi-
ence  of  a  non-accessed  and an accessed  state
differ. Understood this way, Schooler’s criteria
give us opportunities to know  better than the
subject himself what he consciously experiences.
Access and the reports of subjects about their
experience, and the experience itself can come
apart. If this is right, it would be unexpected
and not what the commonsense understanding
of conscious states predicts. As for the first as-
pect,  Schooler  believes  that  mind-wandering
gives us an empirical case, where accessing (in
the  sense  of  attending  to)  a  process  or  state
changes that very state.
3.1 The general distinction between 
conscious experience and meta-
awareness
I will start with a discussion of the motivation
for the distinction (see p. 3), and some general
problems we seem to invite if we accept this dis-
tinction. Schooler, and with him others, presup-
pose that conscious experience and accessibility
can come apart; moreover, there is an experi-
ence  before it  is  accessed.  In other  words,  we
postulate  a  third  category,  besides  conscious
and  unconscious  states:  there  are  now  “con-
scious but not accessed” states. These thoughts
seem to be in line with other considerations in
this debate, which propose a new category of
phenomenal consciousness with no access (Block
2011; Lamme 2003).
Schooler  distinguishes  between  simply
“having experiences”, which he calls that exper-
iential  consciousness,  and  explicitly  “taking
stock” or re-representing this experience, which
he calls  meta-awareness  or  meta-consciousness
(Schooler 2002,  p.  339).  Meta-consciousness
then, is “defined as the intermittent explicit re-
representation of the contents of consciousness”
(2002, p. 339), while a later he says it is “know-
ing that one is having that experience” (2002, p.
339). So meta-awareness is about a certain kind
of access.
Because  we can clearly distinguish both,
mind-wandering  seems  an  excellent  empirical
candidate for the study of consciousness. At one
point we notice our mind-wandering; but  what
we  notice,  the  mind-wandering  itself,  occurs
earlier. In the meta-aware case, we re-represent
the former state; in order to do this, we access
it  by  re-representing  it,  and we “take  stock”.
Then  the  subject  becomes  meta-aware  of  the
state, and we know that we are in this state,
but this very process changes the content. Our
experience of mind-wandering is different once
we become meta-aware that we are mind-wan-
dering.
But  this  seems  conceptually  puzzling.
Access  and  (verbal)  reportability  are  clearly
not the same,  such that missing (verbal)  re-
portability  cannot  not  be  equated  with  gen-
eral  lack of  access,  especially  at  the subper-
sonal level. With knowledge, reflection, re-rep-
resentation  and  meta-awareness,  as  well  as
meta-consciousness, we get additional and dif-
fering  concepts.  First,  often  “knowledge”  is
used as something that is  itself  conscious. Is
the idea that we are aware only of the mind-
wandering, or also of our knowledge that we
are  mind-wandering?  The  author  alternates
between both phrases. But both claims differ.
I can be aware of an experience without being
aware of my knowledge that I have this exper-
ience. The latter includes a meta-level of a dif-
ferent kind. While the first contains a meta-
process regarding the experience, the second is
a  meta-process  referring  to  a  propositional
state, knowledge,  of the experience. As a res-
ult I am aware of being in the state and not
just of the experience. Moreover, reflection is
a vague term. How exactly do we reflect on a
state, process, or content of a state? What ex-
actly does this entail? So the question is: what
is  meta-awareness  and  what  distinguishes  it
from simple awareness? Finally, re-representa-
tion is mentioned, yet another concept used to
characterize meta-awareness.  Without further
explanation, re-reflection seems a very broad
and  vague  concept  that  would  include  all
kinds of  re-represented contents.  Do most  of
these occur unconsciously, as certain kinds of
functional  accounts,  higher-order  accounts,
predict  (Jackendoff 1987;  Rosenthal 2005)?
How is something re-represented? How exactly
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do the represention and the re-representation
relate to one another? 
The question of which types of neural pro-
cesses might be sufficient for awareness is highly
controversial  in  current  debate,  as  is  whether
there can be any awareness of a state without
access (see the exchange between Fahrenfort &
Lamme 2012 and Cohen & Dennett 2011, 2012).
Relatedly, the status of local recurrences is de-
bated. Block and Lamme argue that there are
perceptual  cases  in which subjects  do not at-
tend to a stimulus (in change blindness, inatten-
tional blindness, and attentional blink) and as a
result are not able to report the presence of the
stimulus. They might nonetheless be phenomen-
ally conscious of the stimulus because it induces
local recurrence in perceptual brain regions. As
a result, a subject’s reports are not to be trus-
ted in all cases: subjects could be conscious of
stimuli even when they themselves deny it. This
sounds very close  in  spirit  to  Schooler’s  idea.
However,  Schooler  doesn’t  tell  us how his  ac-
count,  and pure mind-wandering versus meta-
awareness of mind-wandering, relates to this de-
bate. 
Despite these unclear aspects, the underly-
ing intuitive idea is clear: Schooler wants to dis-
tinguish  phenomenally-conscious  experience
from a meta-level of consciousness, in the liter-
ature also  referred to as  meta-awareness,  and
sometimes as reflective awareness, reflexivity, or
reflexive consciousness. But what exactly char-
acterizes  this  meta-level  remains  unclear.  We
are  simply  not  told,  the  used  concepts  seem
vague, and, without further explanation, under-
specified.  But,  of  course,  this  does  not  imply
that the main idea is not helpful, or that it is
not possible to specify them.
However,  Schooler  seems  to  sympathize
with Cohen and Dennett, so I take it that he
thinks (like them), that awareness differs from
behavioral  reportability.  However,  Cohen  and
Dennett  explicitly  state  that  they do  not  see
many reasons to think such conscious informa-
tion exists before it is accessed (Cohen & Den-
nett 2012, p. 140). So they reject the very op-
tion, the third category, that Schooler wants to
postulate.  There seems to be a sharp tension
between  Schooler’s  distinction  and  his  agree-
ment  with  Cohen  and  Dennett’s  general  ap-
proach: Whereas Cohen and Dennett argue that
theories postulating inaccessible conscious states
are  intrinsically  off-limits  to  investigation,
Schooler  not  only  defends  an  account  along
those  lines,  but  also  argues  that  his  account
gives us a solution strategy to overcome the ten-
sion between the first- and third-person. Obvi-
ously, there is a need for conceptual clarification
of this highly original idea.
However, I think we can learn a few inter-
esting things from this. First, we can rule out a
very  general  understanding  of  reflection  or
meta-cognitive  processes.  Most  theorists  agree
that part of what it is to be in a conscious state
is to have a unified perspective on the world. So
the possibility of distinguishing between me and
the world, or a self, or some kind of self-con-
sciousness is required as an indispensable part
of  conscious  experiences  of  many  kinds.  One
way of describing this is to say that experience
includes some kind of  categorization. In other
words,  it  is  a  kind of  meta-cognition  on  this
highest and most general level. At least, we as
humans keep  track of  this  interdependence of
action  and  perception/experience  at  the  per-
sonal level. To mention a classical example, it
seems  very  hard  to  experience  pain  if  one
doesn’t classify something as painful, or without
seeing it as painful for me. Indeed, some kind of
evaluation,  conscious  or  not,  seems  to  be  re-
quired for something to classify as pain; just as,
in order to see something visually as a cow, we
have to classify or categorize it as a cow (Dret-
ske 1993).
At first glance, an account like Schooler’s
cannot allow for this because the standard view
requires  meta-cognition  for  conscious  experi-
ence. Experience is cognitively penetrable, such
that knowledge about categories influences how
we experience an object. In contrast, Schooler
distinguishes both, and wants to allow for ex-
perience before (any?)  meta-level  involved.  At
least he talks sometimes as if meta-cognition in
general  is  the  issue  when  it  comes  to  meta-
awareness  of  mind-wandering.  When  he  talks
about theory of mind and the areas involved in
meta-cognition (Schooler this collection, p. 17),
he suspects that because certain meta-cognitive
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processes  and mind-wandering occupying both
engage the same systems,  specially the dorsal
ACC and the anterior PFC, this might explain
why it is so hard to catch oneself mind-wander-
ing, i.e.,  to gain meta-awareness of mind-wan-
dering.  However,  he  notices  that  identity  of
brain regions does not imply a causal relation-
ship, and that further research is necessary.
However,  it  would  be  hasty  to  conclude
that Schooler cannot concede that meta-cogni-
tion can be involved in  experience on his  ac-
count. Though he talks frequently as if the issue
were meta-cogniton in general, he is not com-
mitted to excluding any kind of meta-cognitive
process. But what is needed is a differentiation
between different kinds of meta-reflection or re-
representation.  Schooler  needs  to  address  the
question  of  whether  we see  the same kind of
meta-cognitive  processes  in  different  kinds  of
experiences, and how exactly this changes the
experience. Interpreted this way, only a certain
kind of meta-reflection or meta-cognition might
establish meta-awareness.  As I will  show, this
move avoids a number of other problems.
We  know  that  experience  depends  on
background knowledge, and that our knowledge
and our classification processes change our ex-
perience in many cases. This seems to be the
case not just in mind-wandering, Schooler’s fa-
vorite example, but also in many other cases.
What matters is not just how I classify a state
or process; many other internal states and con-
textual  factors  influence  experience.  Let’s  as-
sume that I am a big fan of Baroque music, but
cannot  stand  twelve-tone  music.  I  happen  to
blunder  into  a  concert  with  music  by  Pend-
erecki, and of course do not like what I hear.
Simply by gazing at the program and learning
that I am listening to Penderecki’s Saint Luke
Passion, which uses references to motives by Jo-
hann Sebastian Bach and is in a sense a homage
to a well-known Bach piece, how I experience
this piece of music might change. Chances are
that I am still not able to hear the references to
Bach and the coded references to passages in
Lucas  in  the  middle  of  all  the  dense  tone
clusters. But my belief that it is a homage to
my beloved Bach will change my experience in
general. Other states, beliefs, and emotions in-
fluence my auditory experience and make it, in
this case, somehow more enjoyable.7 It is also
well  known that  crossmodal  influences change
experience: ones taste experience changes with
conflicting visual experience. So a pure straw-
berry juice tastes less like strawberry to us if it
is  colored  blue,  even  if  the juice  itself  is  not
altered.8 How we experience a certain wine de-
pends on knowledge  about price,  how famous
the winery is, and many situational aspects. In
these examples, the real question seems to be
how exactly our experience changes, and how do
particular internal and external factors contrib-
ute to the change. What changes in how we re-
represent, and how fundamental is this change?
And what is meant by these terms?9
So Schooler’s meta-awareness can come in
many forms. “Meta-cognition” includes a broad
range of phenomena. What they have in com-
mon  is  that  subjects  have  some  insight  into
their own cognitive functioning. It is not clear
to me that it is an all-or-nothing affair between
pure experience and meta-awareness  or  reflec-
tion. So a specification of what exactly is meant
by  meta-awareness,  re-reflection,  and  access
seems  necessary.  We also  need  to  answer  the
question of how the two categorically differing
states differ in content, and which  exact kinds
of meta-processes are relevant. “Reflection” and
“re-representation” are notoriously vague terms.
Some kind of reflection at least seem indispens-
7 Bayne &  Montague (2011) provide a nice overview of the com-
plex cognitive  phenomenology debate in his introduction to his
volume. One might think that other contents causally influence
the  phenomenology of  a state.  A second option would be that
“what it is likeness” is not a useful conceptual distinction at all
(Lycan 1996, p. 77; Papineau 2002, p. 227). A third option would
be that there are several meanings of “what its likeness”—indeed,
in the literature different distinctions have been suggested. I will
go into more detail in a later section, when I introduce elements
of an improved taxonomy. 
8 See further discussion in Grush (this collection).
9 Regarding visual perception Siegel (2005) has argued that that learn-
ing to recognize an object can change the way that it looks—in the
phenomenal sense of “look”, which is taken to imply that the cognit-
ive components of such states are necessary for explaining the change
in phenomenal character. In contrast, one could argue that the phe-
nomenology does change, but the change can be explained in sensory
terms instead of in terms of cognitive components. Either a subject’s
concepts do not directly constitute the subject’s phenomenal states,
such that they can have a causal influence on their phenomenology
(Carruthers & Veillet 2011), or the contrast between both is the res-
ult  of  differences  in  the  way  that  one  processes  the  information
within the sensory system (Tye &  Wright 2011). For my purposes
here, what matters most is that the phenomenology differs, and that
we need an explanation for it.
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able  for  a  state  to  be  conscious.  But  that
doesn’t mean the distinction above is not justi-
fiable. We just need to determine and specify
the kind of reflection and/or re-representation. I
will make some suggestions later in this paper
(see p. 15).
To be fair, while Schooler does not distin-
guish between different kinds of reflections, he
indirectly  assumes  that  there  are  differences.
But in his view the phenomenon dictates what
the criterion for introspective awareness is. He
distinguishes classification under the concept of
“taking stock”:  “there are some mental  states
(e.g.,  mind-wandering)  for  which  the  crucial
bottleneck  in  people’s  introspective  awareness
stems not from their capacity to classify the ex-
perience, but rather from the fact that people
only intermittently take stock of what is going
in in their own minds” (Schooler this collection,
p. 8).
This obviously implies that for other phe-
nomena the crucial  difference  does  stem from
their  capacity  to  classify  an  experience.  As a
result, we in effect have different criteria for in-
trospective  awareness  and  for  mind-wandering
and visual perception. I believe a more prom-
ising route is to allow for dimensions of reflec-
tion  and complexity  of  experience  along mul-
tiple dimensions, but to try to find as uniform
criteria  as  possible.  The  experience  and  phe-
nomenology  in  cases  of  thought  and  sensory
states (broadly construed) might be different.10
But some properties or property clusters have
to  bind  instances  of  introspective  or  meta-
awareness  together.11 Otherwise,  what  would
justify classifying them as the same, if both the
phenomenon and the properties associated with
the phenomenon differ? We would just be talk-
ing about different things. I have already ruled
out two kind of meta-cognitive processes the au-
thor cannot use for a more detailed characteriz-
ation of the difference between conscious states
and  meta-aware  states:  categorization  under
concepts is one kind of meta-cognitive reflection
that itself is unconscious, but necessary for con-
10 As the complex debate about of the possibility of a phenomenology
of thought suggests.
11 At the very least we would need to insist that there is a family of co-
occurring  properties  playing  an  explanatory  role  within  theories
(Boyd 1999).
scious  experience.  Distinguishing  between  self
and world is another dimension of reflection, at
the highest level,  that seems necessary. Meta-
cognition  always  requires  representational  use
(of some kind), because within it we find monit-
oring  of  cognitive  affordances.  But  there  are
several  ways in which this monitoring can take
place.  As  I  argue  below,  meta-cognition,  the
ability to monitor and control one’s owns cogni-
tion, and the ability to attribute mental states
to  oneself  and  others  can  occur  in  different
ways;  and both the self-other  distinction,  and
self-awareness can occur in a number of ways. 
3.2 Meta-cognitive accounts of 
consciousness: Content vs. function
A core idea in the target paper is the claim that
there is a difference between an experience and
an  experience  one  is  aware  of  having.  Both
states are experienced, but the idea seems to be
that reflection could potentially change an ex-
perience in a certain way, because it focuses on
the content of the intentional formerly un-reflec-
ted state. Interpreted this way, Schooler seems
to  defend the  content  view,  though  I  do  not
think he is committed to it. He doesn’t expli-
citly  subscribe  to  it,  but  it  seems implicit  in
what he says when he talks about the content
of states and frequently switches back and forth
between content talk and talk of experience. He
seems to think that these are related. And he
doesn’t say much about the functional role that
the states in question play in other states, or
how  cognitive  processes  use  them—something
one would expect if he held the functional view.
So it is tempting to interpret him as having the
view that content determines experience (Block
2005). For example,  in writing that there are
“some situations in which observers might have
better knowledge about a person’s mental state
than  does  the  person  in  question”  (Schooler
(this collection,  p.  8),  what he must  mean is
that observers have better insight into the con-
tent of people’s states. A little later, he claims,
regarding misrepresentations, “while in the pro-
cess  of  re-representing,  one  omits,  distorts  or
otherwise  misrepresents  one’s  mental  state  to
oneself and/or others” (Schooler this collection,
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p. 10). Again, what we misrepresent is obviously
the  content of the state.12 If  he has a content
view, than his  view is  that (at  least in some
cases)  I  have  an  experience  first,  and  then,
when I reflect on it, that very process changes
the content of the initial intentional state. That
then is  the reason why the experience  differs
between  mind-wandering  as  “purely  experi-
enced”,  and  mind-wandering  experienced  with
awareness. The phenomenon of mind-wandering
indeed introspectively  changes after  we reflect
upon it, and become aware that we are mind-
wandering. 
But I think there is a larger issue here. In-
terpreted this way, it is tempting to judge that
accounts claiming that what makes a state a con-
scious state is its functional role are inconsistent
with Schooler’s account. Again, I think this would
be too hasty. Let me explain. Assuming a repres-
entational theory of phenomenal consciousness,13
there are accounts that provided in purely first-
order terms and accounts that implicate higher-
order cognition of one sort or another (see below)
with conscious experience. If we accept Schooler’s
distinction,  a  state  is  conscious  before  we  are
aware of it, or know that we are in this state,
and, when we become aware of it, this changes
the state, or its content, to be more precise, as
Schooler seems to suggest. Thus, Schooler seems
to defend a  first-order  account,  namely  an ac-
count in which it is claimed that the conscious-
ness of a state is partly (or entirely) determined
by its representational content, or sometimes the
format of its representational content, not primar-
ily  at  first  the  function  it  plays  (Byrne 2001;
Dretske 1993; Kriegel 2009). 
In  the  class  of  functional14 accounts  we
find a great range of different accounts, includ-
ing second-order accounts, accessibility accounts
(Prinz 2012),  and  global  workspace  accounts
(Baars 1988). Many of these are close in spirit
to Dennett’s. Though they differ, they have one
thing in common: it is a certain functional rela-
tionship  the  states  in  question  have  to  other
states or within the system, which makes these
states conscious states.
12 See also, for example Schooler (this collection), pp. 16-17. 
13 For the purposes of this commentary I neglect biological state theories.
14 On a very broad reading of “functional”.
Second-order accounts, for example, would
claim that what makes a state a conscious state
is that the state is (or is disposed to be, in some
versions) the object of a higher-order represent-
ation of a certain sort. This state is a meta-level
state, a mental state directed at another mental
state. Higher-order accounts differ on how ex-
actly this higher-order representation is charac-
terized and what the exact relationship between
both states is. In some versions the higher-order
representation  is  a  higher-order  thought
(Rosenthal 1986,  2005), in others a higher or-
der-order  perceptual  or  experiential  state
(Lycan 1996), yet other versions see the higher-
order state as dispositional (Carruthers 2000).
There are also differences concerning the ques-
tion of whether the higher-order state should be
understood as entirely distinct from its target
state (Rosenthal), or whether the higher-order
thought is better viewed as intrinsic to the tar-
get state,  which would imply that we have a
complex conscious state with parts. There exist
different versions of the intrinsic view, which all
have in common the idea that instead of a sep-
arate higher-order state there is a global meta-
representation  within  a  complex  brain  state
(Gennaro 1996;  Van  Gulick 2000;  Metzinger
1995). For the purposes of this commentary, I
will focus on Rosenthal’s higher-order thought
theory,  but  my  considerations  generalize  to
many of the higher-order accounts.  The exist-
ence of the higher-order state and the right con-
nection between both (one is the object of the
other)  makes  the  lower  level  one  a  conscious
state.  The higher-level state, however,  is itself
unconscious,  unless  there  exists  a  third-level
state—the  existence  of  which  would  result  in
awareness of being in a conscious state. In ef-
fect, the existence of a certain kind of meta-cog-
nition is what makes the lower level state a con-
scious state, or even a state that we are aware
of being in. In this framework, Schooler’s meta-
awareness would require a third-order state.
Accessibility accounts, for example that of
Jesse Prinz’ (2012), would claim that attention
is both necessary and sufficient for states to be
conscious. In global availability accounts15 it is
15 Initially introduced by  Baars (1988, also  1996). More modern pro-
ponents would be, for example, Dehaene et al. (2006).
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claimed that  the functional  role  is  the  global
availability, or the workspace. The idea is that
there  is  competition  among  neural  coalitions;
the winning coalitions are the conscious ones.
There are a lot of similarities between higher-or-
der theories and the neuronal global-workspace
theory, but we should not see them as theories
of  the  same type.  According  to  the  neuronal
global-workspace  theory,  a  state  is  conscious
due  to  the  global  availability  of  its  content,
whereas higher-order theories see a state’s being
conscious as “consisting of one’s being aware of
oneself as being in that state” (Rosenthal 2012,
p. 1433). If one interprets Rosenthal’s reference
to  “oneself”  as  Metzinger’s  phenomenal  self-
model  (2003),  then  a  higher-order  theory  re-
quires the integration of an individual state in a
coherent representation or inner model of one-
self, in contrast to a global-workspace theory, in
which all that is required is availability of the
content. Both aspects, the kind of meta-repres-
entation (the number of higher-order steps) and
a certain identification of the original state as
my state are dissociable, and they are examples
of what I mean by different dimensions of re-
flection. 
I think Schooler’s account stands in nat-
ural  alliance  with  both  kinds  of  accounts,  in
contrast to what one might initially think. It is
the  vagueness  of  the  term  “meta-awareness”
that is causing this unjustified reluctance. For
example, higher-order thought accounts seem a
natural  way  to  specify  what  Schooler  might
have in mind when he talks about meta-aware
states. According to Rosenthal, there can be un-
conscious pain states, if these are accompanied
by the thought that I am in pain, I am experi-
encing  pain,  but  the  thought  itself  is  uncon-
scious. Only if there is a third-order state, the
thought  that  I  have  the  thought  of  being  in
pain, am I aware that I think that I am in pain.
To  me,  this  sounds  close  to  Schooler’s  meta-
awareness of taking “stock of our ongoing ex-
perience  and  re-represent[ing]  it  to  ourselves”
(this collection, p. 8). However, there is an im-
portant difference: for Rosenthal there are only
conscious and unconscious states; the presence
of the third-order state gives us what Schooler
might call meta-awareness. However, Rosenthal
denies the very possibility Schooler claims ex-
ists, that one can be in a conscious state but
not aware of it. “No mental state is conscious if
the individual that is in that state is in no way
aware of it” (Rosenthal 2012, p. 1425). Due to
the  existence  of  a  third-order  state  with  the
right content, we get introspective awareness of
a conscious state: a third-order awareness that
makes one aware of the second-order awareness.
Rosenthal expects such cases, in which we “are
aware  of  focusing  attentively  on  that  state”
(2012, p. 1427), to be rare. It seems to me that
there is a natural fit between Schooler’s meta-
aware  states,  in  which  we  know that  we  are
having a certain experience and Rosenthal’s in-
trospective  awareness  of  a  conscious  state.  In
Rosenthal’s  framework,  meta-awareness  neces-
sarily requires a third-order representation.
In  addition,  Schooler’s  suspicion  that
“meta-awareness appears to be associated with
rhythms of attentional flux” (this collection, p.
17) relates nicely to accessibility accounts.16 But
as I will claim in the next section, global avail-
ability accounts stand in another obvious alli-
ance with Schooler. Again, it seems that it all
depends  upon  our  understanding  and  further
specification  of  “reflection”  or  the  “meta”  in
Schooler’s  meta-awareness.  Is  reflection  itself
necessarily a conscious process? Is it a thought,
or just any kind of representation for the pur-
poses of monitoring one’s owns cognition or an
explicit  higher-order  classification?  Unfortu-
nately,  Schooler  does  not  describe  his  meta-
awareness in more detail.
It  seems  to  me  that  we  should  concede
that some kind of “reflection” might be required
for something to be an experience. This leaves
still plenty of room to specify different kinds of
reflections, some of which might constitute more
than  awareness,  namely  meta-awareness.  This
becomes the real question. Is this reflection it-
self  unconscious or even necessarily conscious?
Is it a re-representation of some kind? If that is
the case, what kind of re-representation is re-
quired? Schooler’s meta-awareness might require
a rather demanding kind of reflection, and the
16 However, in the end accessibility accounts will not be Schooler’s best
bet—after all, I interpreted him above as agreeing that access and
awareness differ.
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relationship Rosenthal describes seems a good
candidate. But perhaps what we have instead of
a  simple  dichotomy  between  pure  experience
and meta-awareness is a full spectrum of dimen-
sions of meta-representation. Then the question
is,  what  are  the  dimensions  of  reflection  re-
quired  for  Schooler’s  “pure  experience”  and
those for meta-awareness, and which other re-
flections are there? This search for a proper tax-
onomy of “reflection” seems the most pressing
need. It will hence be my main focus, and I will
suggest  some  building  blocks  for  such  a  tax-
onomy (p. 15). Rosenthal’s introspective aware-
ness  of  a conscious state as an possibility for
characterizing Schooler’s meta-awareness will be
one element of this.
3.3 A general concern for scientific 
practice and a conceptual worry
This brings us to another and more problematic
issue. I find the general line of thought behind a
rigid  distinction  between  pure  experience  and
meta-awareness of this experience problematic.
First, it presupposes that we accept the distinc-
tion between access-consciousness and phenom-
enal consciousness—a distinction not everybody
(to say the least) is happy to accept.17 Second,
and more fundamentally, such a new category
would have to be motivated. How do we distin-
guish  “conscious  processes,  which  are  not  ac-
cessed” from unconscious activity? Are they de
facto not explicitly re-represented, or is it im-
possible  to  re-represent  them?  What  does  it
then  mean  to  say  that  something  is
“conscious”?  On might  suspect  that  this  new
concept of  “conscious” is  not compatible with
our  common-sense  intuitive  understanding  of
the  term.  Moreover,  the  stronger  reading  of
Schooler’s  position  might  invite  further  prob-
lems. If we claim that access to a state would
necessarily change the status of its content (or
the content itself), it would be impossible to ad-
dress whether it was of a phenomenal or uncon-
scious nature prior to this conscious access. If
17 However, one might be able to resist the distinction between access-
consciousness and phenomenal consciousness and at the same time
allow for  Schooler’s  distinction  between  experienced  consciousness
and meta-awareness if one claims that access is not what character-
izes the meta-level in Schooler’s meta-awareness.
such an “observer-effect” exists, it could poten-
tially render the whole issue completely immune
to scientific investigation (Kouider et al. 2012).
Another open question is how Schooler’s
account  relates  to  others  that  seem  close  in
spirit.  Dehaene et al. (2006) have presented a
more modern and updated version of Freud’s
concept  of  preconscious  activity.  They  intro-
duce a proposal with a carefully defended tax-
onomy  of  three  categories:  subliminal,  pre-
conscious, and conscious activity. According to
Dehaene and Changeux’s workspace model de-
veloped  a  little  later,  dominant  neural  coali-
tions involving the workspace are  accessed.  In
contrast,  existing  other  weaker  activations  in
the workspace, such as a connection that could
be activated,  for example by a shift  of atten-
tion, are only accessible. Processes that are po-
tentially accessible, but are not accessed at the
moment because of sufficient top-down atten-
tional  amplification,  are  “preconscious”  phe-
nomenal conscious processes in Dehaene et al.’s
terminology (2006, pp. 206-207). I am not sure
whether what Schooler is proposing is another
version of Dehaene et al.’s “preconscious” phe-
nomenal consciousness. This is consistent with
what he writes.  In  debates  on the third cat-
egory of  phenomenally  conscious  but  not  ac-
cessed states, their distinction between cognit-
ive  access  and  cognitive  accessibility  is  often
used to defend the possibility of the aforemen-
tioned third  category  (see  for  example  Block
2011). My own suggestion is related, although I
will  suggest  more  closely  specifying  different
kinds of access (see  p.  11) and multiple levels
of representation, instead of just distinguishing
between accessibility and access.
I  think  Schooler’s  account  would  profit
from directly relating his terminology to other
concepts already in use in the debate. However,
there are problems looming: Dehaene at al. de-
fend a version of  a  functional  account,  which
Schooler  seems  to  explicitly  reject  when  he
seemingly advocates a first-order account. But if
Dehaene’s taxonomy is not what the author has
in  mind,  what  is  the  difference  between  the
Schooler’s  phenomenally  conscious  but  unac-
cessed  activities  and  Dehaene’s  preconscious
activities?
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Let us take stock. I have argued so far for
three closely related points. The basic distinc-
tion between being experientially conscious of a
state  and being  meta-conscious  of  being  in  a
state  needs  further  conceptual  clarification.
Moreover,  the combination of a first-order ac-
count of consciousness (the content view) and
this very distinction might not be the optimal
strategy. In fact, a functional or hybrid account
seems to provide a more natural strategic alli-
ance  for  Schooler’s  main  project.  Finally,  it
seems there is no strict dichotomy between ex-
periential consciousness and meta-awareness; we
rather  face  a  difference  in  many  dimensions.
From  my  perspective,  both  higher-order  ac-
counts  as  well  as  global  workspace  accounts
might be helpful regarding this issue. They con-
nect  nicely  with  Schooler’s  main  project,  and
would help to clarify his basic distinction. But
we might very well end up with a more complex
understanding  of  different  meta-cognitive  di-
mensions  and  differentiations  instead  of  a
simple conceptual dichotomy. This is what I will
provide later in this paper. In order to do this
we  need  to  take  a  closer  look  at  Schooler’s
second step; his argument that his conceptual
distinction is something we find in cognitive ca-
pacities. 
4 Mind-wandering—and noticing it. The 
bundle of critera
On the  basis  of  the  former  considerations  he
presents, Schooler argues that in many capacit-
ies we actually find a difference between being
in a certain state and noticing that one is in a
state  (meta-awareness).  So  he  moves  onto  his
second claim, the claim that his conceptual dis-
tinction is empirically supported (see p. 3). Ac-
cording to Schooler, there are two forms of dis-
sociations,  temporal  dissociations one  the  one
hand  and  translation  dissociations (misinter-
pretations)  on  the  other.  Let  me  begin  with
temporal  dissociations.  Examples  of  temporal
dissociations  are  mind-wandering  vs.  noticing
one’s mind-wandering, but also mindless behavi-
ors,  suppressed  thoughts,  and  unwanted  emo-
tions.  Schooler  mostly  uses  mind-wandering,
however,  characterized  as  situations,  in  which
we  “lose  track  of  the  contents  of  our  own
minds” (Schooler this collection, p. 9). This is
the  starting  point  for  the  introduction  of
Schooler’s new “framework for scientifically in-
vestigating  first-person  experiences”  (Schooler
this collection, p. 9).
I find this focus on mind-wandering a little
puzzling, because I am not sure why this is an
example supporting the general claim that the
content of individual states changes in the spe-
cific intentional states. Why is it an individual
intentional state that changes? Mind-wandering
(at least intuitively) seems to be a complex pro-
cess, and involves a number of states. In mind-
wandering  the  issue  is  creature  consciousness,
not the experience or phenomenal character of
an  individual  state,  i.e.,  state-consciousness.
Mind-wandering is  about a train of  thoughts,
often  accompanied  by  emotions,  and  autobio-
graphical  memories.  In  mind-wandering,  we
mostly think about issues related to our own
life. For example we consider our “to-do” lists
for today, what to have for dinner, our relation-
ship to people close to us,  telephone calls  we
need to make,  and even our next  lecture.  At
least  the  phenomenal  character  we experience
during mind-wandering seems to include these
the  associated  sensory  states—broadly  con-
strued to include feelings of emotions, images,
moods—which have a distinctive “phenomenal
character”  or  “what  it’s  likeness”.  But  the
stream of consciousness  also  contains episodes
of conscious thought.18 If we use this standard
understanding  of  mind-wandering,  it  would
rather be a bundle of thoughts, associations, or
states, in other words a number of many more
or  less  related  thoughts,  emotions,  or  other
states and processes, not all of them necessarily
fully specified in terms of content. And if so, it
is  not  necessarily  the  content  of  individual
states that changes—we seem to have multiple
options for characterizing what changes once we
18 Schooler (2013) gives a good overview of the performance costs asso-
ciated  with  mind-wandering  (including  reading  comprehension,
model building, and impairment of the veto-option to automatized
responses) and suggests that mind-wandering may represent a pure
failure of cognitive control. For this reason it is so useful to study
consciousness. He argues  that mind-wandering offers  little  benefit,
though it might have a positive role in topics related to autobio-
graphic episodes and information,  for example in autobiographical
planning and creative problem-solving.
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are aware that we are mind-wandering. An al-
ternative interpretation would be that the net-
work of  associated elements  might  change,  or
even  the  kind  of  associations  involved.  For  a
conceptual analysis, whether one should include
these autobiographic sensory states in the phe-
nomenon itself or just say the “train of thoughts
in  mind-wandering”  causes  them,  is  unclear.
But it will determine how we analyze the exper-
ience  of  mind-wandering  and the  meta-aware-
ness of mind-wandering, and its implications for
theories of consciousness. There is also evidence
that it has different functions and might itself
be  a  heterogenic  phenomenon (Northoff 2014,
especially  chap.  26;  Metzinger 2013).  For  ex-
ample, it is not clear whether mind-wandering
is the same as day-dreaming, and if not, what
the differences are. 
Moreover,  it  is  controversial  whether
thoughts  even  have a  phenomenal  character,
and if so, how to analyze it (Bayne & Montague
2011).  The  orthodox  view  is  that  conscious
thoughts themselves do not have a distinctive
“phenomenal  character”.  They  are  either  con-
sidered  conscious  without  phenomenal  charac-
ter,  or it  is  conceded that conscious thoughts
might possess phenomenal character,  but only
in virtue of the sensory states with which they
are associated (for example Braddon-Mitchell &
Jackson 2007;  Carruthers 2005;  Nelkin 1989;
Tye 1995). However, recently, a number of au-
thor introduced views according to which con-
scious thoughts themselves possess a “distinct-
ive” phenomenology, but the phenomenal char-
acter differs from sensory states (Siewert 1998;
Pitt 2004; Robinson 2005; Prinz 2004).
So there are a lot of further issues to con-
sider, for a project like Schooler’s; we need to
analyze the experience of mind-wandering and
contrast it with meta-awareness or reflective ex-
perience in mind-wandering. However, Schooler
gives some other examples for temporal dissoci-
ations, which can more obviously be explained
in terms of individual states we do not notice or
misinterpret. He doesn’t go into detail, but has
mentioned  mindless  behaviors,  suppressed
thoughts,  and  unwanted  emotions.  The  idea
seems to be that we are not aware of an indi-
vidual  unwanted  emotion,  or  a  thought  that
causes behavior. However, these case could also
be explained as processes rather than individual
states.  Mindless  behavior  is  in  many  cases
caused  by  a  bundle  of  connected  states,  un-
wanted emotions relate to other internal states
(which make them unwanted), and suppressed
thoughts are suppressed due to other internal
states. 
Nonetheless, if Schooler means by “state”
the “general state of mind”19 rather than indi-
vidual  states,  his  examples  become more con-
vincing.  But  this  seems  inconsistent.  Schooler
takes  inspiration  from Dennett,  who  is  inter-
ested in beliefs subjects have about phenomenal
experience  of  individual  states.  Schooler
switches between talk of phenomenal experience
of individual states, and talk about the stream
of consciousness the subject experiences. This is
evident in the way he introduces the core dis-
tinction, namely in terms of the phenomenal ex-
perience  of  a  state.  At  other  times  he  talks
about states of which I am aware, and some-
times about “what is going on in one’s mind”,
which I take to refer to the stream of conscious-
ness, or more precisely the sequence or combin-
ation  of  contents  of  individual  states,  rather
than a classification  of  the experience  of  just
one  state.  So  the  pressing  question  is  really:
what  kind  of  reflection  is  “taking  stock”  ex-
actly? How should we characterize what we do
when  we “take  stock”  and  reach  meta-aware-
ness? In the following section I present more de-
tailed  suggestions  for  a  taxonomy of  different
kinds of reflection. For now let me just say that
one possible view would be that the content of
these states (or the states) are accessed by other
states, and maybe (unconsciously) evaluated. In
that case, we should talk about complex pro-
cesses rather than re-accessed individual states.
Such a view would also be compatible with cer-
tain higher-order theories of consciousness.
Later in the paper, Schooler discusses ex-
amples of misrepresentation, in his terminology
“translational dissociations”: emotions, or cases
in which it is less controversial whether a phe-
nomenal character is  involved than in case of
thoughts. He gives two examples of such misrep-
19 As  formulations  such  as  “take  stock  what’s  going  in  their  own
minds” (Schooler this collection, p. 8) suggest.
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resentations: emotions of anxiety, which are not
reported, and reported disgust for homosexual-
ity.  In his first  example we find a correlation
with  the  inconsistent  behavioral  measures  of
heart rate and galvanic skin response, as indic-
ators  of  existing  unreported  anxiety.  In  his
second  example  we  have  a  correlation  with
penile tumescence (an erection). In both cases
we know the bodily aspects of the emotion well
(or the caused bodily changes associated with
the feeling on an emotion), and thus, so the ar-
gument goes, have evidence for the occurrence
of the emotion. But in both cases there is also a
discrepancy between the subject’s  reports (as-
suming the subject is honest) and its potential
reportability. Schooler interprets the behavioral
facts as indication of the real emotion the sub-
jects experiences, but in the first case fails to
acknowledge, and in the second misinterprets. 
I am not so sure. First, the theory of emo-
tion  one  feels  committed  to  certainly  plays  a
central role. Schooler seems to presuppose that
unconscious emotions are not possible. Further-
more, it seems to me that both cases are open
to a different interpretation, in fact the same in-
terpretation  I  suggested  for  mind-wandering.
Both  unreported  (or  unreportable?),  emotions
of anxiety and reported disgust for homosexual-
ity are complex cases. It might very well be that
we do not have an individual content of a state
that differs, but we rather simply struggle with
a number of different but conflicting emotions,
the reported one simply being in conflict with
others.  In both cases we have rather complex
scenarios. And if one defends a multi-compon-
ent account of emotions, it might very well be
that the components of these emotions differ—
it could be an element in a network that realizes
the state, instead of the content of an individual
state. This might seem like a minor point, but I
think it is important. It undermines a central
second part of the strategy, namely the empir-
ical  support  for  the  theoretical  distinction.
Schooler needs more than a theoretical distinc-
tion (his first claim); he needs to show that this
very distinction is helpful for understanding cer-
tain aspects of consciousness, mind-wandering,
and other  cases  (his  second claim;  see  p.  3).
Otherwise  the  conclusion  he  draws,  the  new
methodological approach to studying conscious-
ness, would not follow or would lose its plausib-
ility. So undermining Schooler’s second claim by
showing that in the case of his examples related
to emotions (as well as in case of mind-wander-
ing) this evidence is not as clear as one might
think, results in a problem for his view.
But there is another important issue here.
The empirical evidence seems to be relevant to
the stream of consciousness rather than to the
experience versus meta-awareness of individual
intentional states. The formulation of the main
claims suggests that state consciousness is the
issue. However, in other sections Schooler refers
to the stream of consciousness (See quote above,
p. 8). If this is correct, Schooler’s empirical pro-
ject,  or  more  precisely  the  evidence  he  has
gathered, is about a central aspect of  creature
consciousness. Philosophers distinguish creature
consciousness  from mental-state  consciousness:
the  first  is  about  a  subject  that  is  conscious
(either in general or of something in particular),
whereas  state-consciousess  is  about  conscious
states of a creature that it is conscious. Though
Schooler’s project (especially claim (1)) is for-
mulated in terms of state consciousness, the em-
pirical support targets a different kind of con-
sciousness.  This  also  undermines  Schooler’s
second claim by showing that the meaning of
consciousness differs in claims (1) and (2). But,
as I pointed out in section 1, the stream of con-
sciousness  claim  would  be  compatible  with  a
more functional  interpretation of  claim (1)  as
well. There is a way to revise claim (1) in a way
that avoids this problem.
Using  mostly  the  empirical  evidence  of
mind-wandering, Schooler then suggest a bundle
of  criteria  we  might  use  for  the  third-person
evaluation of what is actually going on in some-
body’s mind; in my analysis of his main argu-
ment this is the third step (see p. 3). These be-
havioral  criteria  include  behavioral  measures
(eye-movements,  reading  comprehension,  sus-
tained attention to response) and neurocognit-
ive  criteria  (ERP,  fMRI,  behavioral,  neuros-
cientific,  fMRI and others).  His  list  is  in  the
spirit of a cognitive account, and similar to oth-
ers (Seth et al. 2005; Seth et al. 2008). For prot-
agonists of non-cognitive accounts there seems
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to  be  room  for  attack.  But,  as  I  have  men-
tioned, this is not my project (see p. 2). In this
commentary, I prefer to focus on conceptual is-
sues  within cognitive accounts, rather than the
debate  between cognitive  vs.  noncognitive  ac-
counts (See  p.  2). As long as one commits to
such a cognitive account, Schooler’s list of cri-
teria turns out to be very useful for our evalu-
ation  of  the  meta-components  we  need  for  a
fined-grained understanding of reflection and re-
representation. And this is the case independ-
ently of  the worries  I  presented regarding his
first  two  claims.  However,  I  think  there  is  a
problem looming: Schooler is  challenging both
the  reliability  of  first-person  reports  and  the
view that conscious states are accessible states.
With a position that is in such sharp tension
with our commonsense understanding, he needs
to  motivate  this  radical  move:  he  needs  to
provide  an  answer  to  why we have  this  deep
pre-theoretic  entrenchment  of  the  first-person
accessibility of our own conscious states (Cohen
& Dennett 2011). 
5 A new taxonomy of different kinds of 
reflection
It’s time for a positive proposal. I claimed that
I would introduce suggestions for the building
blocks of a new taxonomy of different kinds of
reflections. As I argued, we need to further spe-
cify  the  kind  of  reflections  required  for
Schooler’s “pure experience” and for his meta-
awareness, and to get a better grasp on what is
meant  by  “taking  stock”  and  “re-representa-
tion”. I also argued that the difference between
consciousness and meta-awareness should not be
understood as a dichotomy. Rather, we should
understand reflection itself as a hierarchical and
multidimensional  process.  So,  what  exactly  is
the “taking stock” required for meta-awareness?
According to  Schooler, meta-awareness requires
an  explicit  representation  of  the  current  con-
tents of thought (2011, p. 321). But at least two
of  the  terms  involved  in  this  characterization
are used in several and distinct meanings: know-
ledge, and explicit representation.20 Explicit rep-
20 For a more detailed discussion of the same issue see Metzinger (2013, p. 11).
resentation might be interpreted as being itself
conscious, or as having symbolic or conceptual
content. The notion of knowledge is also prob-
lematic, simply because knowledge is a factive
verb. It implies that we cannot be wrong.21 As a
result, Schooler built  the impossibility of mis-
representation into his definition of meta-aware-
ness.  This  might be consistent with his claim
that the first-level perspective inhabits its own
ontological realm. But it also creates a problem,
because  any  view that  understands  introspec-
tion or reflection as an inner perception or re-
representation automatically has to allow that
this process can go wrong. In other words, it
has  to  allow  for  misperception/misrepresenta-
tion. Moreover, Schooler himself want to allow
for a certain kind of misrepresentation, in his
terminology translational dissociations—cases in
which  at  the  personal  level  we  misinterpret
what we experience. 
In  my  discussion  of  the  distinction  I
claimed that we are able to rule out two kinds
of  reflections  that  are  not  helpful.  First,  cat-
egorization under concepts is one kind of meta-
cognitive  reflection  that  is  itself  unconscious,
but necessary for conscious experience. Second,
being able to distinguish between self and world
is another dimension of reflection, at the highest
level, that seems necessary for any conscious ex-
perience. Neither of these can be the kind of re-
flection that distinguishes Schooler’s experience
from meta-awareness. In addition I claimed that
both the self–other  distinction and self-aware-
ness can happen in a number of ways. Different
kinds of meta-cognition, the general ability to
monitor and control one’s owns cognition, and
the ability to attribute mental states to oneself
and others, can as a result be further specified
and characterized along those dimensions.
But again, what is the kind of reflection or
“taking stock” required for meta-awareness? At
the end of the last section I suggested that the
kind  of  reflexion  involved  in  “taking  stock”
could be characterized as a case in which the
content of these states (or the states) are ac-
cessed  by  other  states,  and  maybe  (uncon-
sciously) evaluated. So at issue are complex pro-
21 Otherwise we would have a false belief, not knowledge.
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cesses rather than re-accessed individual states.
Such a view is compatible with certain higher-
order theories of consciousness. And this would
allow that misrepresentation is in fact possible.
However,  not  only  do  authors  like  Rosenthal
build  several  meta-representational  levels  into
their  theories,  the content  of  the  higher  level
thought contains an element of self, a reference
to “oneself”. Self-awareness is built in the ana-
lysis, not just any kind of reflection, access, or
re-representation. This interpretation uses a cer-
tain  reading  of  creature  consciousness.  It  re-
quires that an organism is not only aware but
also self-aware. This is a notion of creature con-
sciousness that at first seems to be in tension
with Schooler’s main distinction. However, as I
argued,  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  Self-
awareness  itself  comes  in  degrees  and  varies
along multiple dimensions. Creature conscious-
ness in mind-wandering can than be understood
as an intentional relation between the organism
and some object or item of which it is aware, in
our case a train of thoughts (and/or the sensory
states associated with it). This is where the con-
trast  between  content  theories  and  functional
theories comes into play. As I have argued, pure
content  or  representationalist  theories,  which
claim that  conscious  states  have  their  mental
properties due to their representational proper-
ties,  are  not  a  good  strategic  partner  for
Schooler.  In  contrast,  a  certain class  of  func-
tional accounts, especially higher-order theories,
turn out to be a nice fit for his account. These
accounts  analyze  consciousness  as  a  certain
form of self-awareness. As a result, we can grant
that  for  the  experience  of  mind-wandering
without  meta-awareness  there  is  some  self-
awareness required, and for meta-awareness an-
other more demanding kind of self-awareness is
necessary.  Rosenthal’s  higher-order  account
would  give  Schooler  this  kind  of  distinction:
meta-awareness  would  include  a  third-order
state, in his terminology a re-re-representation,
whereas  the  experience  of  mind-wandering
would involve only a second-order state, a re-
representation (see p. 10).
The  literature  on  phenomenology  offers
more helpful distinctions of how we can further
evaluate  these  different  dimensions.  Most  of
these  distinctions  are  orthogonal.  Several  au-
thors claim that “what is likeness” comes in dif-
ferent  forms.  For  example,  Carruthers  distin-
guishes the “what it’s likeness” of the world (or
worldly subjectivity—what the  world is like for
the  subject—from  experiential subjectivity—
what the subject’s experience is like for the sub-
ject;  Carruthers 1998,  2000). Rosenthal uses a
similar  distinction.  He distinguishes thin from
thick phenomenality, whereby thin phenomenal-
ity  is  the  occurrence  of  a  certain  qualitative
character.  Thick  phenomenality  is  richer:
“[t]hick phenomenality is just thin phenomenal-
ity together with there being something it’s like
for  one to  have  that  thin  phenomenality”
(Rosenthal 2002,  p. 657,  emphasis  added).  So
thick phenomenality includes a certain kind of
reflexion or extra level; it includes an awareness
of a richer kind. For Rosenthal this is identical
with the existence of an appropriate higher-or-
der representation. But it is a specific kind of
meta-cognitive process, one that contains a rep-
resentation of “oneself”, or in other terminology,
a  selfmodel  (Metzinger 2003).  But  the  self-
model itself, our understanding of ourselves and
of  the  difference  between  oneself  and  others,
might  itself  come in  degrees  and on different
levels. So the issue is not meta-cognition or re-
flexion in general,  but different levels  and in-
volvements of self-awareness.
Instead of  focusing on the differing phe-
nomenology, one might also try to specify the
notion of access in further detail (Kouider et al.
2010), a suggestion that I think helps us to bet-
ter understand what is meant by states referring
to other states or accessing them. In the work-
space  model  discussion  a  simple  distinction
between cognitive access and cognitive accessib-
ility is  introduced to defend the possibility of
the abovementioned third category, unaccessed
but conscious states. Instead of just access vs.
accessibility, I suggest that we distinguish differ-
ent kinds of access (see p. 11). Rather than as-
suming  a  rich  phenomenology  and  differing
forms of consciousness, one could also propose
that awareness itself might come in degrees and
that something like partial awareness might ex-
ist (Kouider et al. 2010). Instead of distinguish-
ing dissociable forms of consciousness or differ-
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ent kinds of personal level phenomenal charac-
ter  like  the  above  accounts,  Kouider et  al.
(2010) use sub-personal descriptions explaining
what awareness might be. More exactly, dissoci-
able levels of access are distinguished and differ-
entiated  by  a  hierarchy  of  representational
levels. In case of partial awareness, we have in-
formational access at  some but not all repres-
entational  levels.  The  crucial  idea  is  that  in-
formation at other levels can remain inaccess-
ible.  Or,  in  some  situations,  information  at
these  levels  could  be  accessed,  but  plausible
content is filled, which than potentially results
in misrepresentation.
I prefer this line of thinking, and I believe
it  gives  us an improved understanding of  the
sub-personal processes involved in the different
levels of reflection and “taking stock” we want
to characterize. This framework is very suitable
for a revised understanding of Schooler’s main
distinction. However, Kouider et al. (2010) pos-
tulate partial access as an alternative explana-
tion for conscious visual perception,22 not for in-
ternal  cases  like mind-wandering.  But I  think
the analyses might be useful for our purposes as
well.  According  to  this  framework,  accessible
contents at each level of representation are seen
as resulting from the integration of signals with
contextual prior information, processes that are
also influenced by other internal factors (for ex-
ample attentional factors or vigilance); this in-
tegration is  further  assumed to be modulated
by the degree of confidence of the subject. The
result is a more fine-grained perspective on con-
scious experience; instead of simply conscious or
unconscious, we can talk about different dimen-
sions of experience. And this is done at the sub-
personal level by a specification of access. This
also avoids another problem. As I pointed out,
Schooler’s account seems very close in spirit to
modern  versions  of  workspace  accounts.  How-
ever,  these  accounts  typically  assume  all-or-
nothing mechanisms for access. This is no prob-
22 Like most authors, they focus for the most part on the discussion of
conscious perception, and especially Sperling (Block this collection;
Fink this collection) and Stroop’s paradigms (see Mroczko-Wąsowicz
this collection) and what we can learn from them for consciousness.
For a more detailed discussion of the pros and cons or an under-
standing of consciousness as graded within conscious perception see
the debate between  Cleeremans (2008),  Sergent &  Dehaene (2004),
Seth et al. (2008), and Overgaard et al. 2006).
lem for Schooler, who proposes his core distinc-
tion as a dichotomy. However, it is a potential
problem for the revised view I suggest.  But I
think this can in fact be an advantage. We can
indeed  grant  that  representations  within each
level  might  be  accessed  in  an  all-or-nothing
manner (as  is  assumed in workspace models),
but none the less insist that the full set of all
the representations associated with this process
do not have to be conscious. 
Different terminologies aside, I think this
fits nicely with the spirit of Schooler’s general
distinction, and his distinction between experi-
ence and meta-awareness. I admit that these are
just first steps towards a better conceptual un-
derstanding. But interpreted this way, there is
not just conscious experience of mind-wandering
versus  meta-awareness.  The  situation  is  more
complex. Reflection comes in many forms and
involves representations at many levels, as well
as access at all these levels of representation. In
addition,  whether,  and  to  what  degree,  self-
awareness and a self-model is involved makes a
difference as well. 
6 Perceptual perspective shifting. The 
Analogy and the mind-body problem
Let  me  take  stock.  I  have  been  through  the
claims made in Schooler’s main underlying ar-
gument (see p. 3) So far, I have discussed claim
(1), the initial conceptual distinction been ex-
periential consciousness and meta-awareness, a
distinction Schooler sets up as a dichotomy. I
then  discussed  his  second claim that  there  is
empirical evidence that this conceptual distinc-
tion is something we find in cognitive abilities
in cases of dissociations, especially in temporal
dissociations like mind-wandering and in emo-
tional transitional dissociations.  I  then argued
that his empirical criteria developed in claim (3)
are useful for cognitive accounts in general, in-
dependently  of  the  worries  one  might  have
about claims (1) and (2). Finally I suggested a
finer-grained conceptual distinction between dif-
ferent levels of awareness, different kinds of re-
flection, and “taking stock”. I will turn now to
the  last  issue  we  shall  examine,  which  is
Schooler’s  last  and  main  claim  (see  p.  3):
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Schooler claims that this can be used for a new
theoretical and ontological framework for study-
ing consciousness, and this is the declared goal
of the target paper. He claims that his percep-
tual perspective-shifting analogy, together with
insights from the sections before, gives us a new
ontological perspective on the mind–body prob-
lem, not just a new methodological strategy. I
found this section of the paper surprising. In my
opinion, it is relatively independent of the main
project  he  undertakes.  Schooler  starts  by  de-
scribing the  main thought experiments in  the
philosophical  literature  used  to  challenge  re-
ductive  physicalism.23 He  concludes  that  the
main  problem with  the  reductive  positions  is
that it needs to “reject” those aspects of first
person experience “that are not readily handled
by a third-person account” (Schooler this collec-
tion, p. 25).
I am not convinced that this is correct. It
seems a viable alternative solution to me to just
subscribe to the traditional reply, and point to
some kind of epistemic gap between the third-
person approach and the first-person approach
instead of  an ontological  one.  One can admit
that there is a gap, but it is an explanatory gap
between physical processes and conscious exper-
ience. One could even state that the gap may be
uncloseable in principle, but that consciousness
is nonetheless physical (Levine 1983). That is,
there is an epistemological gap, but no ontolo-
gical gap. That we intuitively see a gap might
be true; it does not follow that there actually is
a gap in what exists. All one can conclude is
that,  epistemologically,  there  is  gap.  In  addi-
tion, our intuitions might simply be wrong: we
might be “innate dualists” and that this is the
reason why to so frequently slip back in dualist
talk  (despite  knowing better;  Papineau 2011).
That is the real reason why commonsense intu-
ition  pumping  thought  experiments  work  so
23 However, this section of the target paper goes beyond the discussion
of the well-known traditional arguments from the phikosophical de-
bate, including the explanatory gap argument, the Mary argument,
and others. Schooler adds a section on the phenomenon of time ex-
perience and reductive accounts that explain time. I found the last
example very inspiring, because in contrast to the other arguments it
is not just based on thought experiments. However, the implications
of this for my purposes here do not matter; they are used as a intu-
ition punp to appeal to the necessity of a meta-level, so I cannot
cover this aspect in this commentary. 
well.  According  to  this  view,  the  feeling  that
some part of reality is “left out”, i.e., the “ex-
planatory gap”, arises only because we simply
cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mind–
brain relation in a dualist way, though this is
actually the wrong thing to do. One can be a
reductive  physicalist  without  having  to  reject
the  phenomenon of  conscious  experience,  des-
pite the fact that we cannot (yet) reduce it or
have proper explanations available as to why we
experience certain phenomena the way we do.
We  can  experience  a  gap,  have  the  intuition
that  something  is  “left  out”,  and  nonetheless
that very intuition might very well be wrong. I
simply do not see the need for Schooler’s solu-
tion, the postulation of a new realm, that gives
rise to both the physical and subjective reality. 
I am also not sure about the meaning of
the perceptual perspective-shifting analogy it-
self. Because it rests on a purely metaphorical
use of “perspective”, the analogy does not go
through.  Perceptual  perspective-shifting  hap-
pens at a personal level, moreover, shifting ex-
perience at the personal level. The supposedly
analogous case occurs at the level of theories or
accounts, which emphasize either the first- or
third-person perspective. But individual exper-
iences differ in principle from the focus certain
theories have. Schooler suggests that the resol-
ution of  the conflicting perspectives  lies  in  a
meta-perspective that acknowledges the exist-
ence  and  irreducibility  of  both,  even  though
both are somehow equally valid, such that the
solution to this tension is a new realm, a meta-
perspective which gives us a “higher-order out-
look” (Schooler this collection, p. 26). However,
Schooler agrees “that [i]t is easier to recognize
the  need  for  a  meta-perspective  than  to
identify precisely what such a view might be”
(Schooler this collection, p. 26). He admits the
character of the introduced meta-perspective is
“speculative  and  highly  underspecified”
(Schooler this collection, p. 28) but thinks that
it has intuitive appeal. He also concedes that
this is the most speculative part of the paper. I
must admit that I struggle with the concept. I
fail to see the intuitive appeal. Mostly because
it eludes my understanding what the proposed
meta-perspective might be and how it is help-
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ful despite acknowledging our commonsense in-
tuition, not at an epistemological but an onto-
logical level. As a result, I do not find it ex-
planatory.  Moreover,  it  does  not  follow  from
the analogy. For an argument by analogy one
needs properties  shared by both parts  of  the
analogy. Even if  we admit that in perceptual
perspective-shifting  both  personal-level  inter-
pretations of an ambiguous figure are equally
valid, it does not seem to follow that the first-
person  perspective  and  the  third-person  per-
spective in strategies to study consciousness re-
quire  a  meta-perspective  not  identical  with
either  of  these  perspectives.  Both  the  cases
seem  to  have  only  one  thing  in  common,
“persepective  shifting”.  But  “perspective”  is
used  purely  metaphorical  in  the second case.
Moreover, bridging the first- and third-person
perspectives  seems  to  be  an  epistemic  chal-
lenge.  But  from  an  epistemic  observation  or
claim  an  ontological  claim  does  not  follow.
Even if we admit an epistemic gap and agree
that  we  cannot  help  but  see  an  explanatory
gap in all these cases, the postulation of an in-
dependent  higher-order  meta-level,  an  ontolo-
gical claim, is not well supported. In addition,
both of these issues, the ontological as well as
the  epistemological  claim,  differ  from  the
methodological approach defended by Schooler.
To summarize, in my opinion this section, and
the  preferences  regarding  solutions  of  the
mind–body  problem,  are  conceptually  relat-
ively independent from the main project, which
I  take  to  be  the  development  of  a  useful
strategy to study consciousness and mind-wan-
dering.  Schooler’s  strategy might be helpfully
independently of whether one is a reductive or
non-reductive physicalist.  I  think that such a
methodological  reading  of  his  approach
strengthens  the  project,  because  it  disassoci-
ates it from a completely different issue. 
7 Conclusion
Having  noted  the  initial  plausibility  of  the
general outline of Schooler’s account, I poin-
ted  out  some  problems  and  expressed  some
general  reservations  about its  scope.  First,  I
argued that the postulation of a third kind of
conscious but not accessed or reflected state is
not justified. As a result,  the account is  too
narrow, because one of the underlying general
assumptions is not justified. This assumption
causes a number of problems and a few misun-
derstandings. However, the assumption seems
conceptually independent of the main project,
which is to allow us to bridge the gap between
first-  and third-person  criteria  for  conscious-
ness. I suggested that the main distinction is
underspecified and needs further clarifications
of the elements involved: access, reportability,
and levels of awareness. 
Second, although it is tempting to attrib-
ute a first-order account to Schooler, a more
convincing alliance would actually be certain
functional  accounts,  especially  higher-order
accounts and global workspace accounts. And
I  argued  that  we  should  replace  the  intro-
duced dichotomy by a finer-grained distinction
of different kinds of  meta-cognitive processes
and meta-reflections in several dimensions. 
In  discussing  support  for  the  underlying
conceptual framework, I  then argued that the
evidence  offered  is  actually  about  complex
cases. As exciting as the empirical results are,
they seem not to be about individual states, but
rather  about  the  connection  between  many
states or even the stream of consciousness. The
project  is  about  creature  consciousness,  not
state consciousness—though the initial distinc-
tion suggests otherwise. This is the first result
of my commentary.
I  would suggest  giving  up the idea  that
the  account  offers  a  new  meta-perspective,
which for Schooler is a preferable alternative to
reductive  physicalist  accounts.  I  do not  think
there is a need for this ontological element in
his account, and it does not seem to fit with the
rest of the methodological project. In addition,
the claim seems independent of the rest of the
project and there are reductive accounts avail-
able that fit very nicely with his project. This is
the second result.
In  essence  I  suggested  a  few conclusions
and recommendations, mostly based on concep-
tual  considerations,  which  clarify  and
strengthen the main project, with which I sym-
pathize. 
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1. We keep many main insights of the paper: 
a) The account is still be a cognitive account,
and we allow that cognitive factors help to
get a grasp on consciousness; the project is
still  to bridge the gap between the first-
and third-person perspective. 
b) We also keep the insight that further pro-
cessing and certain kinds of  further pro-
cesses might either change the state itself
and/or  the  state’s  content.  But  we  ac-
knowledge  that  we  need  to  consider  the
embeddedness  of  the  state  to  determine
the experience.  In other words,  we focus
on  processes  and  phenomena,  instead  of
individual states. This allows Schooler to
associate his project with either a hybrid
account  or  a  version  of  a  functional  ac-
count,  more  specifically  a  workspace  ac-
count  or  higher-order  account.  Which  in
turn  helps  to  specify  the  dimensions  of
meta-processing in more detail and get a
better  grasp  of  the  necessary  conceptual
clarifications.  Nonetheless,  we  still  see
meta-awareness and consciousness as dis-
tinct  phenomena.  I  take  this  to  be  the
driving idea in his initial distinction. 
c) The proposed list  of  potential  criteria  is
still extremely useful, since it helps to de-
termine  these  very  reflective  dimensions
and factors, which determine both experi-
ence and the activities  of  the mind.  For
example,  the behavioral  criteria24 will  be
caused  by  these  very  meta-processes,
which we try to identify in more detail. 
d) Finally,  we keep  the  insight  that  factors
accessible  through  the  third-person  per-
spective can give us insight into what is
going on in the mind, as well as in con-
scious processes.
2. The remaining task, then, is  to specify the
aspects and dimensions that are relevant, and
the kinds of meta-processes, access, or reflec-
tion in question. I suggested building blocks
for an improved taxonomy of different kinds
of reflections and “taking stock”. I suggested
that awareness itself might come in degrees
and at different levels of representation. By
24 For example in the the discussion of emotions p. 13.
distinguishing dissociable levels of access dif-
ferentiated  at  hierarchical  representational
levels, we allow for partial awareness. In ef-
fect, this allows for a fine-grained perspective
on conscious experience. Instead of just un-
conscious,  conscious,  and  a  meta-reflective
level of awareness, we have different dimen-
sions of experience. And this is done at the
sub-personal  level  by a  specification  of  the
term “access”.  But we should restrain from
simply postulating a third category, namely a
state  that  is  unaccessed  (or  un-accessible)
but conscious, thereby avoiding the problems
associated with the postulation of this third
category.  The  resulting  finer-grained  tax-
onomy allows an improved understanding of
how  exactly  meta-awareness  and  conscious
experience differ. Of course there is a price to
pay if we accept this change of focus. While
we can still claim that the criteria give an in-
sight into what is going on in the mind, “the
mind” includes unconscious states, conscious
states,  and  several  levels  of  re-representa-
tional processes. 
There are a number of advantages of a view like
this. First, it is not in conflict with some of the
most  promising  candidates  for  philosophical
theories  of  consciousness.  Moreover,  one  can
still account for the similarity of an unconscious
state and its conscious counterpart. And third,
one can keep the initial idea behind Schooler’s
distinction between the experienced state and a
meta-reflective  level  of  awareness  of  “knowing
that one is in this state”, but would substitute
it with a finer-grained conceptual framework of
multiple differences among several dimensions.
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